T. Sareetha Vs T.Venkata Subbaiah

Court: Andhra High Court.

Citation: AIR 1983 AP 356.

Case Type: Civil Revision Petition.

Date of Judgement: 1/07/1983.

Petitioner: T. Sareetha.

Respondent: T. Venkata Subbaiah.

Bench: Justice P. Choudary.

Statutes Referred:

Cases Referred:

Facts:

Sareetha was studying in High School and living with her parents in Madras. Venkata Subbaiah was from Cuddapah. He had agricultural lands there.
It was contended that a sixteen-year-old Sareetha’s hand was given to Venkata Subbaiah in marriage at Tirupathi on 13/12/1975. They separated almost immediately after and had been living separately for over five years.
Venkata Subbaiah had therefore filed a suit in the Subordinate Court, Cuddapah, under Section 9 of the Act for the restitution of conjugal rights.
T Sareetha raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Court, Cuddapah, in entertaining Venkata Subbaiah’s application.
The Subordinate Judge struck down Seetha’s objection.
Therefore, Sareetha filed a Civil Revision Petition in the High Court.

Issues:

Did the parties live in Cuddapah immediately after their marriage?
If yes, then does their residence in Madras supersede their residence in Cuddapah?
Was section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 constitutionally valid?

The contention by the Petitioner:

The Cuddapah Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of restitution of conjugal rights.
The Petitioner and the Respondent last resided together in Madras. The Respondent himself mentioned this in his statement.
Section 9 of the Act was violative of Article 14,19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The contention by the Respondent:

After their marriage in 1975, the Respondent and the Petitioner lived in Cuddapah for six months. After that, they moved to Madras and lived with the Petitioner’s parents for some time.
Cuddapah was the place where the married couple last lived together within the meaning of the Act.
The Petitioner’s attempts to enter the South Indian Film Industry started creating problems between the Petitioner and the Respondent’s parents. Therefore, the Respondent was forced to leave the Petitioner back in Madras and return to Cuddapah.

Obiter Dicta:

The Subordinate Judge was correct in holding that the couple lived at the Respondent’s Cuddapah residence immediately after their marriage.
Section 19(iii) of the Act refers to the matrimonial home of the parties to the marriage.
Cuddapah would be called the matrimonial home of the couple. This marital residence could not be superseded by their temporary residence Madras.
Sexual Cohabitation is an essential aspect of a decree of restitution of conjugal rights.
The decree of restitution of conjugal rights transfers an individual’s choice to engage in marital intercourse from the individual to the State.
Forced sexual and consensual act are both equally potent in producing offspring. Conception and delivery of a child involve the most intimate use of a woman’s body.
Restitution of conjugal rights constitutes the grossest form of violation of an individual’s right to privacy.
Article 21 of the Constitution safeguards the right to privacy and promotes individual dignity.
Reproductive choice is fundamental to an individual’s right to privacy.
There is no overwhelming state interest that can justify violating an individual’s constitutional right to privacy.

Judgement:

The Cuddapah Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application made by Venkata Subbaiah.
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is null and void.
The application filed by Venkata Subaiah in the Subordinate Court, Cuddapah, for the restitution of conjugal rights with Sareetha was legally incompetent.
The Subordinate Court, Cudappah, was prohibited from trying Venkata Subbaiah’s application.
Revision Petition was allowed.

Rationale:

The Petitioner did not specifically deny the Respondent’s claim that the couple lived in Cuddapah immediately after their marriage.
A place where a married couple only lives temporarily cannot be said to be their marital home or the place where the last resided together within the meaning of Section 19(iii) of the Act.
The Respondent had a permanent home in Cuddapah where he ate, slept, and worked. He was a farmer there and had a sacred bond with the land, which served as his home and place of occupation. This permanent resident of the Respondent was also the matrimonial home of the couple.
Nothing can be more degrading to the human spirit and more monstrous to the human spirit than forcing an individual, by law, to engage in a sexual act against their wish.
A woman’s consent and wish must never be excluded from the process that involves such intimate use of a woman’s body, such as giving birth to a child.
The decree of restitution of conjugal rights denies a woman of her free choice regarding how and when her body becomes the vehicle for the procreation of another human being.
The right to privacy belongs to each one of the married couples individually. It is not lost because of their marriage.
Ancient Hindu law, the culture and the ancient lawmakers never envisioned nor allowed for a forcible union even in marriage.

Conclusion:

The State cannot force an individual to engage in a sexual act. An individual’s consent and wish are the fundamental aspect of a sexual act. The consequences of that act are usually much worse for a woman. In no way can a woman be ordered to undergo the excruciating process of giving birth if she doesn’t want to do so voluntarily. State interference in a couple’s marital life cannot be justified. No state interest can justify such an intervention. The Court observed that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage was barbaric, ancient and constitutionally inept. It was deemed to be null and void.

Prepared by Mihir Poojary.

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