Munshi Ram And Others Vs Delhi Administration

Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 702, 1968 SCR (2) 408

Bench: Hegde, K.S.

PETITIONER:MUNSHI RAM AND OTHERS

RESPONDENT:DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT:27/11/1967

ACT:

Indian Penal Code, 1860,

Displaced Persons Act, 1954-

Facts

1. The property in concern was five bighas and thirteen biswas situated in Kilokri which was an evacuee property and intrinsically was under the management of the managing officer.
2. That property was acquired by the Central Government under the Displaced Persons Act, 1954.
3. The same was sold by public auction on January 2, 1961 and purchased by Ashwani Kumar Dutt for a sum of Rs. 7,600. Provisional delivery of that property was given to the vendee on October 10, 1961.
4. The sale certificate was issued on February 8, 1962. the particular delivery was given on June 22, 1962 as per the warrant issued by Khushi Ram, the managing officer. The said delivery was suffering from it.
5. Sham Das Kanungo. On July 1, 1962 when PW 17 and his father PW 19, R. P. Dutt visited the sector with PW 16, Gopal Das, PW 15 Nand Lal and one B. N. Acharya with a trac- tor to level the land, the appellants came armed with spears and lathis attacked the complainants’ party and caused injuries to PWs 17 and 19 and thus the tractor driver, B. N. Acharya.
6. Though the appellants in their statement under s. 342 Cr.P.C. denied having been present at the scene of occurrence or having caused injuries to anybody, the plea taken on their behalf in the least stages was one among private defence.
7. Their case is that their relation Jamuna (DW 3) was the tenant within the land for over thirty years. His tenancy was never terminated. He had raised crops within the field in question. There was no delivery on June 22, 1962.
8. If there was any delivery as alleged by the prosecution, an equivalent was without the authority of law and intrinsically was of no effect. Hence, Jamuna continued to be in possession of the property even on Dominion Day, 1962.
9. On the day before the occurrence, PWs 17 and 19 tried to intimidate Jamuna to return to terms with them and to peacefully deliver possession of the property to them.

Issue

1. whether the appellants have established satisfactorily the proper of personal defence pleaded by them?
2. if that they had that right, have they exceeded an equivalent?

Obiter dicta

Right of personal defence serves social purpose and therefore the right should be liberally construed. Such a right won’t only be a restraining influence on bad characters but also will encourage manly spirit during a law-abiding citizen.

Rationale

Jamuna was in effective possession of the sector on the date of the occurrence. But it had been urged on behalf of the prosecution that rightly or wrongly that PW 17 had taken possession of the property on June 22, 1962, and therefore, if Jamuna had any grievances, he should have agitated an equivalent during a court of law, which his relations had no right to require law into their own hands.

This contention is predicated on a misconception of the law. If by the alleged delivery PW 17 couldn’t be held to possess been put in possession of the sector, he couldn’t be said to possess been in possession of an equivalent . the very fact that some formalities were skilled in pursuance of an unauthorised order issued by PW 5 is not any ground for holding that possession of the sector had passed into the hands of PW 17 Steps taken by PW 17 et al. who accompanied him on June 22, 1962 were unauthorised acts. it’s true that nobody including truth owner features a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he’s evicted in due course of law, he’s entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner.

But stray ,or even intermittent acts of trespass don’t give such a right against truth owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be a settled possession extending over a sufficiently long period and acquiesced in by truth owner. an off-the-cuff act of possession wouldn’t have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner.

The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he doesn’t use more force than necessary.

Judgement

On the idea of the proved facts, it can’t be said that the appellants had exceeded their right of personal defence. within the result, this appeal is allowed, the conviction of the appellants is about aside and that they are acquitted. R.K.P.S.

The court also said that right of personal defence is social purpose

Conclusion

The law concerning defence of property is, began in s. 97 IPC, which says that each person features a right, subject to the restrictions contained in s. 99, to defend-First-his own body, and therefore the body of the other person, against any offence affecting the human body,

Secondly. -the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of the other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief. or criminal trespass, or which is an effort to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.

Section 99 of the Code lays down that there’s no right of personal defence in cases during which there’s time to possess recourse to the protection of the general public authorities. It further lays down that the proper of personal defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it’s necessary to inflict for the aim of defence.

By- Bharti Verma