CASE BRIEF
Appellants: Deep Chand
Respondents: The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
Decided On: 15 January, 1959
Judges/Coram
Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., B.P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.
Equivalent Citation
AIR 1959 SC 648
Statues Referred
- The Constitution of India: Articles 13, 19 (1), 31, 32, 37, 132, 133, 245, 246, and 254
- Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955: Sections 3, 4, 5, 8 and 11 (5)
- General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 6
Facts
- The petitioners were carrying on business as stage carriage operators on different routes in Uttar Pradesh under valid permits issued under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 along with buses owned by Government.
- However, the U.P. Legislature passed Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955- under Section 3 Government issued a notification nationalizing routes.
- The appellants received notices under Section 5 of the U.P. Act requesting them to file objections, if any. After the objections were received, they were notified that the same would be heard by a Board.
- The objections filed by all the operators other than those of the Agra region were heard and the inquiry in regard to the Agra region was adjourned however the operators of the Agra region failed to appear again.
- A notification was issued under section 8 of the Act was published in the U.P. Gazette. Additionally, the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority, Agra, sent an order alleged to have been issued by the Transport Commissioner to the operators of the Agra region barring them from operating their stage carriages on the specified routes and also notifying them that their permits would be transferred to other routes.
Issue
- Whether the provisions of Part III of the Constitution enshrining the fundamental rights are mere checks or limitations on the legislative competency conferred on Parliament and the State Legislatures by Arts. 245 and 246 read with the relevant entries in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or are in integral part of the provisions defining, prescribing and conferring the legislative competency itself?
- Whether the doctrine of eclipse is applicable only to pre-Constitution laws or can apply also to any post-Constitution law which falls under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution?
Contentions by Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 passed by the Parliament is wholly repugnant to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 and for that reason the latter becomes void under the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Indian Constitution; with the result that, at the present time, there exists no valid law wherein under the Government can exclude the appellants from exercising their fundamental right under the Constitution viz. to carry on their business of motor transport.
- The scheme framed under the Act, being one made to operate in future and from day-to-day, is an instrument within the meaning of section 68B of the impugned Act, and as a result the provisions of the impugned Act would prevail over those of the scheme, and after the impugned Act came into force – it would have no operative force.
- Even if the impugned Act was valid and continued to be in force in regard to the scheme framed thereunder, it would offend the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution, as it was before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, as, though the State had assimilated the appellant’s interest in a commercial undertaking and no compensation for the said interest was given – as it should be under Article 31.
Respondent’s Arguments
- On behalf of the State, it was argued that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, had the effect of removing the inconsistency and, therefore, the Amendment Act III of 1948 became operative again. Moreover, even if the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, could not be relied on to sustain the validity of the U.P. Act, there was no deprivation of property of the appellants.
- The learned Advocate General relied upon certain precedents in support of his contention that the word “void’’ in Arts. 13(1) and 13(2) means only “unenforceable” against persons claiming fundamental rights, and the law continues to be in the statute book irrespective of the fact that it was made in infringement of the Fundamental Rights.
Judgment
In the present matter the Apex Court held the following:
- If any law is made after the 25th January, 1950, which is repugnant to the Constitution, then the statute is void since its very birth and anything done under it is also void and illegal in India, as is followed in America, and even convictions made under such an unconstitutional law will have to be set aside by resort to exercise of powers given to this court by the Constitution.
- While comparing the provisions of the U.P. Act and the amending Act it becomes clear that both the Acts are envisioned to operate in respect of the same subject matter in same field. Nevertheless, the unamended Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 did not make any provision for nationalization of transport services whereas the State introduced amendments to implement scheme of nationalization of road transport.
- In the result, all the appeals are dismissed with one set of costs to the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Rule of Law
The provision of the law which was under scrutiny by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was the Doctrine of Eclipse. It was clarified that any post constitutional law infringing fundamental rights are void ab initio and the doctrine of eclipse cannot apply.
Conclusion
In Conclusion it could be said that in this case the Supreme Court through its judgement has laid down a great requirement under the law that there exists a clear distinction between the two clauses of Article 13 of the Indian Constitution. Under clause (1) a pre-Constitutional law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, whereas as per clause (2), no post-Constitutional law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception.