By Aditi Tiwari
Actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea- An act does not make one guilty unless the accused has the necessary state of mind required for that offence. This Latin maxim literally implies that to prove a criminal act there must be proved a criminal intent to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of such intent, the criminal liability is negated. The concept of insanity per se is not defined anywhere in our criminal law, the primary statute being the Indian Penal Code, 1860, where section 84 (under Chapter IV which recognises general defences from criminal liability) says that “Act of a person of unsound mind.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”
This principle is said to be based on the legendary common law precedent of M”Naughten of 1843, which establishes the same rules, the most important of it being that the accused for harbouring under a ‘disease of mind’, which is a legal term and not a medical one. Thus, it is important to note that the law only recognizes the concept of legal insanity and not mental illness per se, which limits the scope of the defence itself. The leading decision on what constitutes ‘disease of mind’ was decided in the landmark British case, R vs Sullivan, [1]which is a modern authority on the defence of insanity. The House of Lords in the case held that the effect of the disease of mind impairs the faculty of reason and understanding, drawing a distinction from the rarely granted defence of automatism, which also results in the lack of culpability but due to external factors that would grant absolute acquittal of the accused from both the court and the mental health system. For insanity to qualify as legal insanity, the prerequisites of Section 84 must be met.
Legal Developments
The burden of proof in the case of insanity lies on the accused to prove. In the rather recent case of Surendra Mishra vs State of Jharkhand,[2] the supreme court upheld this stating the accused has to satisfy the preponderance of probabilities. In the given case, the accused shot at a man at a point-blank range, threw away the weapon, threatened the driver of the deceased of dire consequences, and also ran away from the place of the crime. His act of trying to conceal the crime clearly show a conscience of guilt. The conduct of the accused post the act also showed that he knew what he was doing was not only wrong but also illegal, and though the accused (appellant in the case) suffered from certain mental instability both before and after the incident, there is nothing to show from his conduct that he suffered from unsoundness of mind at the time of commission of the offence, in the sense he did not know the nature of his act. Had he been unsound, he would not have been able to run a medical shop either which he was as proved from the facts of the case.
In a similar albeit much older case, the court again held that in order to exempt act from being offences under Section 84, unsoundness at the time of commission of offence must be proved [3]and despite the accused in the case having a medical history of schizophrenia, where he was cured of it later but had a relapse after the commission of the act, there was nothing to show by the witnesses that he was incapable of discriminating between right or wrong between the two periods. His conduct after the act, which was to conceal the weapon so much so that it could not be apprehended after searches, bolt the door of his house to prevent being apprehended, among other such facts display a nature of guilt. The accused knew the nature and consequences of his act.
The court made a very important observation in the Surendra Misra case, where an accused who seeks exoneration from liability has to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Rejecting the claims of the appellant, the court relying on its precedent of Hari Singh Gond v. State of Madhya Pradesh[4], observed that the mere fact that the accused has a mental ailment which rendered his intellect weak, affected his emotions to indulge in unusual acts or abnormal behaviour at intervals or had queer behaviour is not enough to attract the application of Section 84 as a defence. Insanity itself has no precise definition, and has been equated to unsoundness of mind but refers to mental disorder in varying degrees.
The court in Bapu @ Gajraj Singh vs State of Rajasthan [5]also observed-“Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section 84 as the law contained in that section is still squarely based on the outdated Naughton rules of 19th Century England”. Thus, every person who has some sort of mental disorder is not exempted from criminal liability.
Therefore, when a plea of legal insanity is set up before the courts, it does not only have to take into account the unsoundness at the time of commission of offence, although it is the crucial point for ascertaining liability, but also the incidents before and after the commission of the crime, i.e., the totality of the circumstances to ascertain the accused was unable to appreciate the wrongdoing.
Criticisms of the defence of insanity
Firstly, the legal understanding and definition of insanity has not advanced significantly even with the developments in modern psychiatry, where sometimes the ability to differentiate between right and wrong remains intact- cases where the accused is held criminally liable, and this alone is not enough because “insanity does not only, or primarily affect the cognitive or intellectual faculties, but affects the whole personality of the patient, including both the will and the emotions”[6].The M”Naughten test is said to be based on outworn medical notions as capacity to distinguish between right and wrong can be retained while the mind of accused can be disordered impairing his other abilities. Thus, an insane person may commit an act knowing its wrong and forbidden by law but still commit it as a result of his mental disease.
The Law Commission in its 42nd report in the year 1971, regarding changes in the IPC dealt with Section 84 in great detail. The report talks about other jurisdictions and how they have adopted the defence of insanity. The report cites the examples of Tasmania, Australia, and France among others which recognise the concept of ‘irresistible impulse’– the person knew the nature of his act or that it was contrary to law but was deprived of any power to resist such commission by reason of mental disease. The Durham test adopted by the United States District court of Columbia in 1970 further modifies the test stating a person shall not be held liable if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect.[7] But even in the view of all these criticisms and alternatives available to the M’Naughten test, the law commission recommended no change to Section 84, stating more practical difficulties could arrive if the rules were liberalized- for example the medico-legal issues that would come up in the trial, presence of quality medical experts to examine it in all districts, etc.
Nonetheless, as far as the success rate for this defence goes, in data collected where the High Court Judgements were reviewed to estimate the same, it was found from a total of 102 cases studied, the courts convicted the accused in 76 cases (74.5), thereby rejecting the insanity defence.[8] The most common crime for which the plea was raised was that of murder- 78 cases. The nature of cases was that of an appeal by the accused against the verdict of a lower court sentencing him/her for the crime. In cases where the accused was acquitted, the documentary evidence relating to the mental illness both prior and after the incident, the opinion of the psychiatrist were associated with the success rate of the defence. Thus, clearly the defence of insanity is not an easy one to prove.
[1] [1984] AC 156
[2] (2011) 11 SCC 495
[3] Jai Lal vs Delhi Administration, 1969 AIR 15
[4] (2008) 16 SCC 109
[5] Appeal (crl.) 1313 of 2006
[6] British Royal Commission Report on Capital Punishment, 1953
[7] Durham v United States, 214 F.2d 862
[8] Parthasarathy Ramamurthy, Vijay Chathoth, and Pradeep Thilakan, How does India Decide Insanity Pleas? A Review of High Court Judgments in the Past Decade, Indian Journal of Psychological Medicine, March 2019.