Citation: 1989 SCC (3) 287
Case Type: Civil Appeal
Case No: 2635/1989
Appellants: Smt. Annapoorani Ammal
Respondents: G. Thangapalam
Decided On: 01-05-1989
Statues Referred: Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Specific Relief Act, 1963
Bench: Oza, G.L. (J) Shetty, K.J. (J)
Facts:
The appellant had purchased a property via registered sale deed on 27-12-1950 executed by Asirvada Nadar, Ponnammal and Devadasan for consideration of 7,000.
The respondent on 04-01-1951, executed a rent agreement in appellant’s favour as her landlady @ 80 p.m.
In 1963 the mother of the appellant died and in 1974 the respondent filed a suit for transferring property in its favour upon the ground of ‘Yadast’, which was alleged to have been written by the mother of the appellant. The document provided that the respondent is entitled to conveyance of property in the suit from the appellant upon the condition that the sale price 7,000 and registration expense of 1,000 shall be paid.
The ‘Yadast’ was just a plain piece of paper with no stamp or registration or attestation. Also that the said document was not mentioned in the notice which was served by the respondent nor there was any reference anywhere whatsoever.
The Sub Judge of the trail Court relied upon the ‘yadast’ and decreed the suit. Whereafter an appeal was filed to the Additional District Judge, which upon the consideration of the fact and evidence of the case held that the mother of the appellant was not a party to the sale deed and therefore she had no right to execute a conveyance deed.
The trail Court also held that the document wasn’t genuine and was a forged document and hence was void.
After an appeal to the High Court, and after detailed analysis of the facts, the Court was in consonance with the findings of the trail Court. And hence the special leave petition was filed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether High Court had the jurisdiction to interfere in the present case.
Whether a decree for specific performance could be decreed against non-executant of contract.
Obiter Dicta:
Ratio Decedendi:
The suit for specific performance of the contract can be availed only when the executant is the rightful owner of the property. And in the present case the mother of the appellant had no right of the property and hence could not execute the ‘Yadast’.
If theory of loan was asserted to then ‘Yadast’ was a mere document of reconveyance. The High Court failed to observe that the respondent was not the executant of the sale deed in favour of the appellant.
Also the High Court failed to state out the reason upon which the first appellant court came to finding that this document is a forgery and could not be said to be a correct document. Yadast beared a date which was precedent to the sale deed but the said document was never mentioned in sale deed or rent agreement.
On a perusal of Section 100 of the CrPc, it shows that the High Court can intervene in only when a substantial question of law was involved. But the judgement of the High Court depicts that no substantial question of law was involved
The only reason upon which the High Court adjudicated the matter was that the signature of the Ramalakshmi Ammal was a mere surmise but the Supreme Court found no basis upon the facts and held it to be imagination of the High Court.
Judgment:
The Apex Court’s bench comprising of Oza, G.L. (J) Shetty, K.J. (J) held the following:
The interference of the High Court upon the reason that the case involved a substantial question of law was held to be invalid by the Supreme Court and hence could not be justified.
Hence the High Court was not fit to interfere with the finding of fact as reached by the lower appellate court.
The appeal was allowed and the High Court Judgement was set aside.
The Court allowed the cost of appeal @ ₹ 3,000.
Conclusion:
With regard to matter containing question of law the High Court is competent only to the extent that there is a doubt upon its decision or when the lower court opines that such question of law should be best left upon the High Court to adjudicate. But without such ground an interference by the High Court shall breach the jurisdictional limit of the judicial authority.
Kaushal Agarwal.