Published on: August 16,2021
Petitioner – Jagannathan And Ors.
Respondent – The State of Madras
Decided on – 23 September, 1983
Equivalent citations: 1983 CriLJ 1748
Bench: R Pandian
Statutes Referred:
The Indian Penal Code
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Facts:
This revision is preferred by accused 1 to 4 in Crime No. 49/81 of Ponneri Police Station, registered under Sections 448, 341 and 323, I.P.C.
The revision petitioners challenging the legality of the order passed by the learned Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Ponneri, before whom the above said case is pending, rejecting the prayer of the accused in Crl. M. P. No. 1216/82.
They seeking the stoppage of further proceedings in the matter on the ground that the investigation in that case, which is a summons case, had not been concluded within a period of six months from the date of their arrest, as contemplated under Section 167 (5), Cr. P. C and seeking an order striking off the charge-sheet and discharging the accused.
Issues:
Are the duties cast upon the Court and the police officer under the first and the second parts of Sub-section (5) of Section 167, Cr. P.C. independent of each other and is the police (officer) statutorily obliged to get the permission of the Court to continue the investigation if it is not concluded within the six months’ period fixed under that provision, even if the Magistrate has not fulfilled his obligation by stopping the further investigation into the offence?
Can it be held that the Magistrate by not discharging his statutory obligation of stopping further investigation into the offence has impliedly permitted the investigating officer to continue his investigation?
Whether the investigation carried on by the investigating officer beyond the period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused is illegal?
Petitioner’s contention:
Mr. Sam V. Chelliah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners submits that as the prosecution in this case relates to a summons case and as the investigating officer has not obtained an order extending the time for continuing the investigation after the lapse of six months from the date of arrest of the petitioners-accused, as contemplated under Section 167
Cr. P.C.
The investigation conducted after the lapse of the statutory period of six months from the date of arrest of the petitioners without the permission of the Court, culminating in the laying of the charge-sheet, should be held to be non est in the eye of law and hence the entire proceedings before the Court below should be quashed.
Judgement:
“Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Bench in Nimeon Sangma v. Home Secretary Government of Meghalaya while expressing his view that pre-trial detention for a considerable period goes against the spirit of the Cr. P.C. and the Constitution, has pointed out thus:
Criminal justice breaks down at a point when expeditious trial is not attempted while the affected parties are languishing in Jail. The C.P.C, in Sections 167, 209 and 309, has emphasized the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigations and trials. It is unfortunate, in deed pathetic, that there should have been such considerable delay in the investigations by the police in utter disregard of the fact that a citizen has been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an offence. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the Constitution, especially under Article 21 as interpreted by this Court.”
“Coming to the present case the occurrence took place on 2-3-1981 and accused 3 and 4 were arrested on 9-3-1981. The rest of the accused surrendered before the Court. Though the charge-sheet is purported to ‘have been signed on 6-5-1981, The court have already concluded that the investigation in the present case had continued till 25-2-1982, that is to say, well over a period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused. The case has been taken cognizance of on 12-3-1982. The petition before the Court below for stopping the proceedings was filed only on 10-6-1982. Hence, in view of above finding of the court the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in the case and the further proceedings conducted thereafter are not liable to be quashed on the ground that the investigation was illegal.”
“Mr. Sam V. Chelliah has further submitted that though he has not filed any petition for quashing the proceedings invoking Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the cognizance of the offence in the present case has been taken beyond the period of limitation as provided for in Section 468 (2) (b) of the code, inasmuch as the facts of the case clearly show that cognizance was taken beyond the period of limitation, this Court may be pleased to quash the proceedings on this ground, if not on the ground of non-compliance of Section 167 (5).”
“Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, The court is not inclined to direct the accused to come by way of a separate application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing the proceedings since the case is pending for more than two years. Further, the court feel that the expedience of justice demands that in the present case the alternative plea of the learned Counsel has to be considered.”
“As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel, the offences in this case, viz., under Sections 448 441 (sic 341) and 323, I.P.C. have been taken cognizance of after the expiry of the period of limitation as contemplated under Section 468 (2) (b) viz, beyond a period of one year. In the present case, the prosecution has not filed any petition under Section 473invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court below to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, when the punishments provided for these offences are one year and less, the cognizance of the offences sought to have been taken within a period of one year from the date of the offences. Indisputably the trial Court has taken cognizance of the offences beyond the statutory period of limitation of one year. On that ground, the entire proceeding in C. C. 78 of 1982 on the file of the Court below is quashed, though not on the ground of the illegality of the investigation.”
Held:
It is therefore held thatthe revision petition is allowed, and the entire proceeding in C. C. 78 of 1982 on the file of the Court below is quashed, though not on the ground of the illegality of the investigation.